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Abstract  
 
        While anchored in the logic of empirical validation of the theory of segmented labor 
market, this study propose to go beyond the structure of the labor market based on the formal 
and informal divide,  to the use of a structure based on Institutional Differentials associated 
with the hold job protection and Regardless formal or informal workplace. The approach in 
this context raises a quite relevant problematic in linking the issue of segmentation of labor 
market to that of validation of the theory of human capital. To do this, we used the data 
available from micro 'consumption and income "Among Households survey Conducted by the 
National Office for Statistics in 2000 (Algeria). 
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1. Introduction 
 
For all neoclassical economists, the labor market is a homogeneous space governed by 
uniform rules, perfectly competitive. The salary was supposed to flexible, which allowed 
adjustments of supply and demand work. While other analyzes were designed to show the 
contrary, the labor market is not as assumed by the neoclassical, but there are various areas of 
mobility within the market working. Wages could be rigid or for institutional reasons or for 
organizational reasons and methods for managing the workforce, or because of relationships 
specific job.  
 
 
In Algeria we are seeking of a transition economy that is experiencing serious difficulties. The 
low growth rates
1
 added to the failure in job creation to absorb the growing demand in the 
labor market
2
, testimony to the continuing difficulty of the country to develop. 
Its structure is characterized by the limited capacity of job creation in the formal sector 
combined with a negative trend in productivity, lower labor compensation and inefficiencies 
in the education system. Such macroeconomic characteristics explain the importance of the 
informal economy
3
. The excess labor supply over demand in the formal private and public 
sectors push some young graduates to the informal labor market which actually absorbs a 
significant portion of the labor surplus (this is a relatively new phenomenon in Algeria). The 
informal sector has regained one of its essential functions and traditional "anti-crisis" 
implementation by households to ensure their survival. The absence of unemployment 
benefits for first job seekers and more generally the weakness of the welfare system 
accentuate this sense, the informal sector while appearing as the main opportunity to pay for 
the assets but also poached for newcomers  in the labor market, may have thus an incentive 
effect with respect to certain segments of the population hitherto the inactive such as the old, 
women, or children. The recession of the mid-80s, as occurred in Algeria, has indeed 
stimulated the interest in "small trades» that appear gradually as an alternative for a young 
and dynamic workforce looking for their first job. Finally, the compensating effect of the 
informal sector also intervenes through the growing phenomenon of moonlighting as a 
reaction to declining purchasing power of households observed from the late 80s. 
 
Since the 90s, no study on the segmentation of the labor market in Algeria has been made. 
The only attempts that existed focused on the definition and measurement of informal 
                                                          
1
 The GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth rate in Algeria had an average of 1.5% between 1990 and 1999, 
rising to 2.2% in 2000, 2.7% in 2001, 4.7% in 2002, 6.9% in 2003, 5.2% in 2004 and 5.1% in 2005, 6% in 2007, 
4.9% in 2008 and 4.5% in 2009  
2
 The participation rate increased from 6% to 27.9% between the 1987 and 1998 censuses. It reached to 43.9% in 
2008 census.  
3
 Researchs on the functioning of labor markets in developing countries have largely developed in recent years 
through the analysis of the functioning of the informal sector. There have demonstrated the growing importance 
of the informal sector in its contribution to employment (between 1 / 3 and 2 / 3 of total employment) and 
production (1 / 5 of GNP) (Charmes, 2000). 
3 
 
employment
4
 . Since 1992, surveys of the workforce could cast some criteria for defining the 
informal sector to informal employment to locate. In this case, the social security registration, 
place of performance of the activity, the size of the institution, the status of the institution, the 
registration form and method of taxation. All these criteria are strongly correlated, so we can 
settle for one as advocate Lakehal and Ali Bacha (1994). In their work, they identify the non-
agricultural informal workers by the lack of registration with social security
5
, justifying their 
choice from a preliminary work where they show that there was a strong correlation between 
criteria, and therefore they could settle for one. The choice fell on registration for social 
security since this variable is populated for all categories of workers. In addition, at present, 
informal employment is defined by the characteristics of the job, in this case the non-
registration, there is no contract or no social protection (BIT 2003). 
 
By taking position in this context, this study aims to fill an important gap in the analysis of 
the use and operation of the labor market in Algeria. It aims to answer questions relevant to 
the socio-economic policies. We try to answer important questions such as: How to allocate 
the job? Is there a segmentation of the labor market
6
? What are the determinants of the 
allocation of individuals to various segments? To do this, we begin with a brief presentation 
of the theory of segmentation of the labor market. We will then give the econometric model 
through which we attempt to test the hypothesis of segmentation of the labor market in 
Algeria. Subsequently, we will begin micro econometric study on the basis of micro data from 
the income-consumption survey conducted through 2000 households. We begin by identifying 
segments structuring labor market in Algeria, and then we will make the econometric test.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 Adair (2002), Adair et Bellache (2009), Hammouda and Musette (2000), Hammouda (2006),… 
5
 In Algeria, each occupied must be affiliated to a social security fund, applicable to all persons of any 
nationality whatsoever, working in Algeria in an employed or assimilated self-employed or are in training. The 
Algerian social security system includes disability and death, old age insurance, accident insurance and 
occupational illnesses, family benefits (family allowance, schooling allowance) and unemployment insurance. Its 
organization is based on four cases: the CNAS (National Social Insurance Fund for employees), the CASNOS 
(social security fund for self-employed), CNR (National Pension) and CNAC (National Fund of unemployment 
insurance). They are placed under the guardianship of the Minister of Social Security, for the first three, and the 
Minister of National Solidarity for the last. CNAS manages the collection of all social security contributions and 
ensures that function on behalf of CNR and the CNAC. She manages the benefits in kind and cash social 
insurance of occupational accidents and diseases and family benefits on behalf of the State. CNR manages 
pensions and retirement allowances and pensions and allowances for dependents. CNAC administers 
unemployment benefits and initiates action to support troubled firms to safeguard employment, and reintegration 
assistance for the unemployed. CASNOS ensures the recovery of contributions from independent and manages 
the benefits intended for them (illness, maternity, retirement, disability and death). 
 
6
 We adopt a structure based on the differential institutional protection of the employment and irrespective of 
whether formal or informal workplace. 
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1. The Algerian context: Informal Employment and Social Protection: a wedding (im) 
possible? 
Large sections of society focus on the level and evolution of the unemployment rate to assess 
the situation of the labor market in Algeria. It seems that this view is somewhat simplistic 
since the ILO experts propose a series of key indicators of the labor market (KILM) to have 
an objective assessment. In the Algerian case where we are talking about an economy in 
transition, the dichotomy between active / inactive, occupied / unemployed, employed / self-
employed are not always resolved. Indeed, in-depth analysis of labor market behavior of 
social agents reveals the existence of several forms of activity and employment making a halo 
between inactivity and unemployment. This is how the world of labor has changed 
dramatically over the last twenty years. These changes are both structural statutory and 
sectorial.  
Indeed the first challenge has been that of the predominance of the public sector in the mid-
eighties by a series of financial restructuring organic and financial, followed by drastic 
employees firing. With hindsight, we see that in reality these cuts have most affected the 
weakest link in the labor force meaning less skilled and older. Indeed, companies that have 
survived the wave of destructuring-restructuring will continue to hire more staff educated, 
younger and more feminine. Compressed staff will go either into inactivity (retirement and 
early retirement), or in the formal sector (government and formal sector) for those who have a 
share capital, or unemployed and will activate in the semi legality in what is commonly called 
the informal sector in all its heterogeneity due in part to the premium for voluntary departure. 
An unemployment insurance fund (NACC) will be specially created to compensate some of 
the workers laid off for economic reasons, usually younger and therefore can neither benefit 
from early retirement nor a voluntary severance consistent package since it is proportional to 
the length of service. During this transitional period marked by turbulence, compressed 
workers will continue to benefit from social protection (thanks to the contributions of the 
public sector) and cumulative (for some) undeclared activity in the private sector either as an 
employee or independent. Even retirees and pre-retirees (some of them at least) will continue 
to engage in gainful employment as informal because of their low pensions but also a 
continual loss of purchasing power due to lack of appreciation consistent. Indeed, the system 
of indexing pensions in force, is not quite clear, and the argument of the financial balance of 
cash, ultimately takes precedence, even if the union is involved. This argument is he the road 
given the number of new jobs announced for several years now? So indirectly it is the public 
sector workers that fund part of the system of social protection of employees in the private 
sector. This imbroglio is related to uncertainty surrounding yet the identification of assured. 
To illustrate our point, we can mention the land transport sector both urban and intercity, we 
passed a few public enterprises operating in compliance with the labor legislation thousands 
of small businesses operating in the semi private law insofar as they do not comply 
consistently social legislation. This fragmentation of the productive system is also observed in 
other sectors such as trade, industry, textile or building with consequent weakening of wage 
labor. Indeed, even from the point of view of union representation, the law provides that from 
5 
 
the nine employees. It is true that the law provides for the possibility of grouping workers 
more businesses neighboring cell to form a union. In fact nothing of the sort happens.  
How disguised wage workers intramural could be seen? This is particularly the case of 
working from home. In the building industry the situation is even more worrying in that the 
working conditions are at high risk - occupational diseases and accidents are legion. In fact, a 
large segment of the workers in this sector is excluded from any form of social protection. 
Unlike the Textile sector, building sector is more visible and therefore more controllable as 
part financed by public expenditure. Do not forget that a significant proportion also active in 
self-building, which is another difficulty to enforce labor legislation in all its rigor. The retail 
sector has also undergone fundamental changes to its configuration that has seen the 
disappearance of public enterprises and monopoly on foreign trade. Thus it has been 
completely atomized as a new configuration with a core group of wholesalers and importers, 
backed by hundreds of thousands of freelancers and employees working at the limit of legality 
enjoying some permissiveness, which makes any attempt to organize the profession random. 
In this sector as well as Services, many questions come to mind: what are the working hours? 
What about the weekly rest or annual leave? 
Regarding agriculture, after attempts of its integration in a system of universal social 
protection in the 1970s, it is noted that it continues to operate according to specific standards, 
although Employment there grew in recent years. But wage growth in this sector, calls our 
attention concerning the actual functioning of this segment of the labor market. What is the 
part of the peasants, wage earners in agriculture who benefit from the welfare system? 
Women, children, elderly exercise seasonally as extra work needed at different times. Should 
be in this case go to insurance plans tailored to different sectors? This is the case for example 
in Tunisia, which has significantly improved their social security coverage. 
Following this brief overview of the development sector in direct connection with the 
evolution of Algerian productive system, it should be interesting to analyze the evolution of 
employment status. We distinguish two phases: the first starting from independence until the 
mid eighties when the proportion of employees increases, then a second period that continues 
until today when the trend reverses as the proportion of non-employees is increasing. Even if 
the two social security funds (paid and unpaid) are independent, fleeing social tax non-
employees could eventually undermine the balance of the protection system in its entirety if it 
remains in its current configuration. And in this case we should stay in a contributory system 
(funded by employee contributions) or move towards a system of universal type and therefore 
financed by taxes? Moreover, since there is a background consisting of 2% (3% since 2011) 
of the oil tax is expected to power the pension fund, and a portion of the population is directly 
supported by the budget State. It is even expected that the State take over all or a portion of 
payroll taxes for new hires according to predetermined criteria under the new employment 
policy. The extension of coverage is a challenge for public policy for decades to come. This 
question is largely obscured by the debate on the financial sustainability of the social 
protection system in its various components (health insurance, retirement). Note that so far the 
family branch remains a challenge. Its funding and generalization should be a wide debate on 
the extent of the issue. This debate is all the more necessary it is always a confusion largely 
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maintained between the minimum wage and family budget type. In fact, the minimum wage is 
theoretically related to labor productivity and therefore economic activity while the family 
budget type refers to the family structure that evolves according to the life cycle. 
At this level of analysis we propose several tracks reflection for a generalization of the social 
security: how to account for the strong heterogeneity whatsoever among employees or non-
employees? In particular how to integrate the status of the non-wage workers to non-
employees? In fact, this category includes youth and women in companies that activate or 
family farms when this activity is not recognized and taken into account at the time of 
retirement. For employees, it seems to us that the treatment of TCE is unfair. Indeed, 
unemployment insurance introduced in 1994 was intended as accompaniment of downsizing 
during the structural adjustment period to minimize the social impact. So, how to widespread 
unemployment insurance to all TCE as well as their proportion among employees is 
increasing and knowing they contribute under social insurance? Flexibilisation of the labor 
market should be designed taking into account the need for social protection of the worker. 
This question should be entered in the agenda of the tripartite. What kind of union 
representation of employees in fixed-term contract or are they voiceless?  
Changes to the actual functioning of the labor market that we have seen over the past twenty 
years and in the future pose the problem of the necessary institutional adaptation to correct 
malfunctions and informal employment. The coexistence of two segments of the labor market 
operating according to different standards from each other formal and informal, is it normality 
in economic transition or a phenomenon of exclusion of a fringe of social actors (younger, 
less educated, women, rural)? 
We have to admit that the scrutiny of the evolution of employment over a long period makes 
us look more towards the second explanation, and ask The question thus bringing the way of 
those excluded. Are they represented in the tripartite? This question seems quite relevant to 
the extent that there is a question of "insiders" who are in the formal sector (government, 
public and private formal economy). Can we achieve social and macroeconomic equilibrium 
omitting expected when more than half of the labour force is excluded? Social exclusion is 
thus a reality on the labor market. "Outsiders" are organized to survive on the edge of the 
formal borders. In fact, beyond the discourse of informal, no concrete action has been 
implemented to protect workers from the informal sector, particularly in its legitimate form, 
legal and lawful.  
Another remarkable change in the occupational categories, the continued decline in the part of 
workers section. This decline is due to the reduction in the share of industrial sector in job 
creation. If we consider that the worker is the figurehead of unionism because of a strong 
collective identity, what would be the implications of such a reconfiguration of the social 
landscape? In return we note increasing categories of staff and middle and senior 
management. Hence probably a lack of representation of emerging categories in the union 
which led the historic landscape reconfiguration Algerian union. This fragmentation of union 
representation of employees undermines the principle of solidarity in the workplace which is 
based on the social welfare system. While substantive questions about the mechanisms of 
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redistribution of the fruits of growth are obscured in favor of a single system that the 
redistribution of income return. How is redistributed non hydrocarbon growth between wages 
and profits? It is clear that the share of compensation of employees in the household income is 
decreasing in favor of the non employees who mixed income (profit plus remuneration of 
unpaid labor). On the other hand the share of wages in value added (hence the wealth created) 
is low. This leads us to say that informality is not due to the excessive costs of labor and 
therefore the cost of legality. But the new employment policy of taking over part of the salary 
costs for new recruits implicitly assumes that the demand for labor by employers is low 
because of alleged excessive cost of labor. 
 
2. Theory of labor market segmentation: a brief introduction  
     
The first dualistic models, including Lewis who opened the field in 1954, were based on the 
wage gap between a traditional (agricultural) and a modern sector. But they do not take into 
account the phenomenon of unemployment. This full employment assumed that authors 
explain the lack of services covering the risk of unemployment, did not fit the majority of 
empirical results.  
The second generation introduced three possible deviations of the market. Each individual has 
a choice between a job in the modern sector employment in rural sector or unemployment. 
Among the most famous, quoting the publication of Harris and Todaro in 1970 and the work 
of Mincer in 1976. These models make account both of the dual compensation (modern urban 
sector, the agricultural sector) and the existence of unemployment.   
The equilibrium condition is expressed by the equalization of incomes in each sector, taking 
into account the probability of unemployment. The interconnection between the rural and 
urban areas is done by migration. Although these models have not neglected the unemployed, 
they are still far from reality. For them dichotomy urban / rural partition is considered to 
modern / traditional. They do not take into account the existence of an urban informal sector, 
which can not be confused with the modern urban sector. It will then wait for a new 
generation of models appear to see specifically the urban informal sector. This differs from 
the modern sector covered mainly by direct access mode. The modern sector is protected 
(institutional regulation, union power, ..) while the informal sector is often characterized by 
the absence of barriers to entry. The existence of four possible states (unemployment, 
employment in formal, informal and agricultural) make strategies choice of actors quite 
difficult. Two types of behavior were identified (Roubaud, 1994, p200, 201):     
        
Model 1: Lopez (1970), Mazumdar (1976) 
 
● Remain in rural areas, without being able to get a job in the modern sector and earn 
farming income.  
8 
 
● Seek employment in an urban area. If an opportunity is offered to hire in the modern 
sector. If not, and the number of places available, work in the informal sector.  
● Otherwise, remain unemployed.  
 
Model 2: Fields (1975)  
 
● Remain in rural areas, without being able to get a job in the modern sector, and earn 
income agriculture.  
● Due unemployed, seeking employment in the modern sector. If an opportunity is 
offered to hire in the modern sector.  
● Otherwise, remain unemployed. 
● Due used in the informal sector, seeking employment in the modern sector, with a 
lower probability to get that as unemployed (which can devote all his time? If an 
opportunity is offered to hire in the modern sector.  
● Otherwise, stay in the informal sector and earn income from this sector.  
 
        Both models need to establish a hierarchy between the three income opportunities. These 
are the conditions to ensure balance. were: 
 Model 1:       WMAI       and    WMII   
 
 Model 2:                    WMAIII   
 
Where: I = income, W = wage, and the three sectors respectively: agricultural (A), informal 
modern (I), modern formal (M). 
 
 
3. Empirical test of the segmentation of the labor market  
 
If the segmented nature of the labor market corresponds to observed reality, there is no 
explicit model of the segmentation for a clear test of the theory. Empirical works for the most 
part, are based on the dual version of the theory
7
 by focusing on the existence of differences 
in returns to education and experience between segments and barriers to entry in the sector 
with high wages. On the opposite, sector workers in low-wage enter the high-wage sector and 
force wages until wages across the sector are equalized. 
Based on this conclusion, the first empirical work
8
 testing the dual hypothesis is to compare 
two wage equations estimated over two sub-samples of a population. However, the conclusion 
of this test is distorted by the existence of sample selection bias (Heckman 1976, 1979). This 
                                                          
7
The work of Doeringer and Piore (1971).  
8
  We refer to Heckman and Hotz (1986) for a discussion of this works.   
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bias appears whenever you use a sample selected in a larger population to test behavioral 
relationships.  
In order to proof to the fullest extent possible, we conducted a series of tests for market 
segmentation working on the basis of the application initiated by referential Gindling (1991). 
While starting with the Chow test to test the stability of the coefficients of earnings equations, 
then discusses the analysis of wage differentials that exist between the three segments of the 
labor
9
market.  
 
3.1 Presentation of the econometric model   
The model presented in this subsection allows on the one hand relating logarithms (natural 
logarithm) wages with human capital variables for each segment and on the other, to address 
the issue of bias selection. It is written as follows:   
 
mnpiimnpiimnpmnpi eXeXw 
''ln                                    
AiiAiAiiAAi eXdXeXw 
'''
'
ln                                            (1)                              
mpiimpiAimpiimpmpi eXdXdXeXw 
''''
'
ln 
 
 
 
Where i  identifies the individual or, mnp according to the modern sector jobs unprotected, A 
indicates the sector of agricultural employment and mp shows the modern sector jobs 
protected. With wlog  the logarithm of the monthly salary, which is here the dependent 
variable of the earnings equation, X  is a vector of human capital (education, experience and 
experience squared) , d differences, and  a vector of parameters to be estimated . 
 
Lets ijY   the unnoticed utility by the individual derived when working in the segment J . The 
individual must make a choice between the three segments structuring labor market. This 
choice is made by comparing the utilities from the various possibilities, and it focuses on the 
option that corresponds to the maximum utility.  
Let’s iM  designs the value observed of j  for the individual i , then: 









)max(
)max(
)max(
ijimp
ijiA
ijimnp
i
YYifmp
YYifA
YYifmnp
M                                                     (2) 
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 This latter is in the sens with the test of the hypothesis of limited mobility in mind of Gindling (1991)..  
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Thus, the utility function of individual i  who chooses the alternative j  is written as follows:  
 
ijijjij ZKY 
'
            ),,( mpAmnpj                                                            (3)   
 
Where: 
 
   ijZ  
is a matrix of individual characteristics observed us:  the place of 
residence, gender, marital status, education level, age and age squared. 
 
 jK is a vector of coefficients to be estimated.  
 ij  is a random component with conditional expectation zero in Z . 
 
Since the individual is observed only in one of three segments, then the wages will be subject 
to the results of (2) and (3). Thus, the wage equations are written as follows:  
 
     









mpMifw
AMifw
mnpMifw
w
mp
A
mnp
ln
ln
ln
ln                                                 (4) 
 
 
Now, taking the expected of the logarithm of wages conditional on the segment to which the 
individual is affected captured by (4), we obtain: 
 )/()/(ln
' jMeEXjMwE jjj              ),,( mpAmnpj                               (5) 
 
 
Selectivity is present if 0)/(  jMeE j , that is to say, when individuals in a given segment 
are not a random subset of the population. In this case, the classical estimation method of 
ordinary least squares does not provide consistent estimators in general. 
 
Gindling (1991) in his work used the procedure developed by Lee (1983) to correct the 
selectivity, which allows taking into account more than two alternatives. In our work, we will 
not develop the whole procedure, but is limited to the essentials.   
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Suppose that the perturbations   are independent and follow the same law of Gompertez 
whose distribution function is ))exp(exp()( vvF  then the allocation model to different 
segments of the labor market is multinomial logit. Thus, the probability that the individual i  
chooses the segment j  is given by the following equation:  
)exp(/)exp()(
,,
''
i
mpAmnps
siji ZKZKjYP 

                                                 (6) 
 
The correction of a possible selection bias is to introduce the inverse Mills ratio )( in the 
earnings functions as an explanatory variable obtained from the first model of affectation to 
the segments of employment. It is given as follows:  
 
  
 
)(
))((1
jYP
jYP
i
i
j




  , ( ),,,( mpmnpAJ   )                                     (7) 
    
 
Where   and   are the standard normal density function, and the standard normal 
cumulative function respectively and the )( jYP i   are defined before. Existence of a 
selection bias will result in a significant coefficient and notifies the non-random allocation of 
individuals in the areas of employment affects wages earned. Thus, the equations of the gain 
can be formulated as follows:  
 
mnpimnpmnpimnpmnpi uXw  
ˆln '  
AiAAiAAi uXw  
ˆln '                                                              (8)               
mpimpmpimpmpi uXw  
ˆln '  
 
The parameters of the system of equations (8) are estimated using ordinary least squares. A 
simple formal statistical test used to test the existence of selection bias; it amounts to test the 
null hypothesis: 0:0 jH   
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3.2 Stratification of the labor market in Algeria    
 
Remaining within the logic of empirical validation of the theory of labor market 
segmentation, we adopt a structure based on differential institutional protection of their job 
and regardless of formal or informal workplace (agricultural employment, Modern 
unprotected and protected modern). It will be appreciated by a set of variables available in our 
database namely: Membership Social Security Status in employment, payment mode and the 
Legal sector, and using the classification procedure in dynamic clouds after having extracted 
agricultural employment. 
 
This is a sample of 11063 employees drawn from a database from micro 'consumption and 
income "Among Households survey Conducted by the Office for National Statistics (Algeria) 
in 2000. The survey is spread over a year. It is conducted with a representative sample of 
12000 households spread across the country. Its purpose is to estimate consumer spending 
Algerians and their annual income. It also covers other parameters such as employment, 
spending on health, education and recreation.This sample represents a total of 4145000 
employees. The choice of this basis (although a bit old) is due to the fact that investigations 
"employment" conducted annually by the ONS do not capture earnings. It should be borne in 
mind that the expenditure surveys of household consumption, unlike employment surveys do 
not capture activity during the reference week but one week in mobile since the last survey a 
full year. On the other hand, the employment component is reduced to its simplest expression. 
These two points make comparability with surveys job is not easy. 
 
3.3 Wage Gap   
           
To complete our approach and to make it as rigorous as possible, we add the analysis of pay 
differences between the three segments. These differences may result from many factors. A 
portion explained by differences in productive characteristics of individuals and companies to 
which they belong and the one hand and unjustified related to differences in the returns on the 
labor market with identical characteristics. Adopting the methodology that was used by 
Oaxaca and Ransom (1994), the difference in log wages between two groups of workers j  
and /j ( j  and /j  mpmnpA ,,
/JJ  ,) can be written as follows:    
 
                                                                                                                                                           
(10) 
             
         
)ˆˆˆˆ()ˆˆ()ˆˆ()(ˆ)ˆˆ( ln //
/
///
***
00 jjjjjjjjjjj
j
XXXXW  
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Where jX  and  /jX are the averages of individual characteristics for both groups,  jˆ  
and /ˆ j  are the averages of terms of selectivity for both group and 
*ˆ represents the 
estimated non-discriminatory wage structure
10
. So,       
)ˆˆ( /00 jj    :  The gap issue of the wages autonomous (difference between the constants). 
)ˆˆ( * jjX  : The estimation of the wage advantage in favor of the majority party.     
)ˆˆ(
/
/
*
j
j
X    : The estimation of the wage disadvantage of the minority party.
  
)(ˆ /
*
jj
XX   : The estimation of the productivity difference between the two   populations.  
It is the justified   part; the wage gap is explained by differences in productive characteristics 
of individuals......... 
//
ˆˆˆˆ
jjjj
   : The wage gap attributable to selection bias. 
  
4. Presentation of results 
4.1 Identification of segments of the labor market 
The first segment is the agricultural jobs, representing nearly 7% of the employee population, 
there is a majority of employees who are not affiliated to the social security and enabling the 
private sector. It is also non-permanent employees; the majority is paid by the day. The 
dominant level of education is the primary knowing that the age of 25 is the dominant one. 
The average monthly salary received by an employee in this job group is about 9200
11
AD. 
The second segment includes nearly 23% of employees. All employees of the Group are not 
affiliated to social security, activating particularly in the private sector. Large fractions of 
them do not receive monthly salaries and do not have stability in employment (about 60% of 
them are not permanent). The modal age group is the 25-34. The middle school education 
level or less characterizes the employees in this segment. The average monthly salary 
received by an employee in this job category is about 9000 AD.  
The third segment occupies a little more than 70% of total employees. As a whole, the 
employees in this segment are affiliated to the social security and almost all of them have a 
stable employment (more than 90% have stable contracts). They operate mainly in public 
administration (64.60%) and public economic sector (27.85%) knowing that all of them have 
monthly salaries. Women are fairly represented in the present this group compared to other 
segments (15.88% of employees in this segment are women, against 0.93% for the first 
segment and 9.39% for the second). The modal age group is the 35-49 since it represents 
                                                          
10
 The coefficients of the non-discriminatory situation are calculated by estimating an earnings equation on the 
entire population. 
11
 1 USD = 75.2569 AD in 2000. 
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more than 40%. The modal level of education for this group is the secondary school knowing 
that 13.17% of workers in this group have a higher level. This rate does not exceed 3% for the 
other two segments. The average monthly salary received by an employee in this job group is 
a little over 14700 AD. 
4.2 Econometric test of the segmentation of the labor market       
Firstly, a model of allocation to different segments of the labor market is estimated using a 
multinomial logit model. However, the use of this type of model is dependent on the 
satisfaction of the basic assumption "independence of irrelevant alternatives (IAA). For this, 
we appealed to the Hausman specification test (1978). This is to test the null hypothesis that 
the inclusion of a segment does not change proportionally choice between the other two 
segments. The strategy is to estimate the model with and without the segment failed every 
time. If the IIA assumption is true, the estimated coefficients restricted and unrestricted model 
should not be statistically different.   
The test results show that the IIA hypothesis is rejected for the agricultural segment. This 
calls into question the multinomial logit specification for which is replaced by a multinomial 
probit specification. 
 
The results of the estimation show that the assignment is not random, but is governed by a set 
of variables. Indeed, the fact of living in a rural area to promote access to agricultural jobs and 
discourages access to modern unprotected. In addition, men are more likely to be employed 
agricultural or unprotected against women. The fact of having a higher level of education 
increases the chances of getting a protected job. Moreover, being not single increases the 
chances of access to agricultural jobs compared to the modern protection jobs and reduces the 
chances of access to modern jobs which are not protected compared to the modern protected 
jobs. Variables related to age are growing a negative contribution in the formation of chances 
of getting either an agricultural  job or modern unprotected one. 
Secondly, testing the hypothesis of segmentation is done by integrating the functions of gains, 
the inverse Mills ratio calculated from the first model (probit multinomial). The results of this 
estimation show that the coefficient associated with the inverse Mills ratio is significant and 
negative in the equation for the modern protected employment and significant and positive in 
the equations for the modern unprotected employment as well as agricultural employment. 
This indicates the existence of unobservable factors that contribute to the formation of wages. 
The Fisher test shows that all three models are globally significant at 1%. However, the 
explanatory power of these equations is considerably low
12
 and varied from one segment to 
another. In the equation of the segment of modern protected employment, the regression has 
the best explanatory power, or 36.38% of the total variability. Regression equation on the 
                                                          
12
 Though Mincer (1993) believes that education and experience alone explain a third of the variance in wage 
rates in Western countries.  
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segment of agricultural employment ranks second with a rate of 17.49% and is the last, there 
is the model for the segment of modern unprotected employment, with only 16.30%. This 
result reinforces the hypothesis of segmented labor market insofar as the human capital theory 
doesn’t fit with the last two segments of employment.  
 
Finally, all variables related to human capital are significant and with the expected signs. 
However, the yields associated with human capital are the most important within the segment 
of modern protected jobs and much less in the segment of modern unprotected jobs. This 
conclusion is reinforced by the Chow test conducted to test the stability of the coefficients of 
equations taken two by two, it can reject it at a significance level of 1%. One equation can not 
alone explain the formation of gains on the labor market. It also reinforces the hypothesis of 
segmentation of the labor market in Algeria.  
 
Having used the Oaxaca decomposition method Ransom (1994), the absolute wage gap (in 
logarithm) is estimated at 1.367 points for the modern protected segment from the modern 
unprotected segment (Table
13
5).It amounted to 1.189 if we exclude self wage differentials due 
to selectivity. The share is close to explain only 27%, while the rest is not explained. These 
wage benefits granted to protected employees (11.17%), but above all wage disadvantages 
imposed to employees of the unprotected modern segment (62.05%). When analyzing the 
absolute wage gap the results are almost the same (log) in the benefit of employees of the 
modern protected segment compared to the employees of agricultural segment. It is estimated 
at 1.293 point in favor of the employees receiving institutional protection or 1.428 points 
difference excluding the selectivity and wages autonomous. A little more than 20% just this 
difference is explained by differences in productive characteristics and the rest are associated 
with wage discrimination. The wage gap (in logs) for the employees of the modern segment 
unprotected vis-à-vis the employees of the agricultural segment is almost marginal, it is 
estimated at 0.074 point in absolute value.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we sought to test the hypothesis of segmentation of the labor market in Algeria 
Based on the Heckman procedure to correct for selection bias after setting three segments 
structuring the labor market in Algeria. The first econometric results have shown the non-
random assignment of individuals to different segments of the labor market. It turned out that 
the fact of living in a rural area promotes access to this segment, most men are more likely to 
be employed agricultural or unprotected against women. Thus, having a higher level of 
education increases the chances of getting a job protected. It was noted also that not being 
single increases the chances of access to agricultural jobs for the jobs modern protection and 
                                                          
13
 Coefficients of the non-discriminate are shown in Annex.  
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reduces the chances of access to modern jobs unprotected. Variables related to age have a 
negative contribution in the formation of chances of getting an agricultural or modern 
unprotected job. 
After correcting for selection bias, the analysis of mechanisms for determining gains shows 
that these vary considerably across segments. This is achieved thanks to the Chow test which 
shows that the earnings equations are significantly different from each other. Although yields 
associated with human capital are the most important segment in the modern protected jobs 
and much less in the segment of modern unprotected jobs.  
Decomposition method of wage differentials used in this work has enabled us to meet the 
significant differences (log) for employees working in the modern protected segment 
compared to those operating in the other two segments. Very important fractions of these 
differences are not explained (more than 75% on average). These are mainly disadvantages 
imposed on other employees, but also employee benefits belonging to the protected segment. 
The estimated wage gap in favor of employees of agricultural segment vis-à-vis employees 
the unprotected modern segment is marginal. 
   
At the end of this work we were able to make some of the results that may be useful in 
understanding the functioning of the labor market in Algeria. Knowing that the country is 
about to be modernized where salary system takes another form more precarious than the old 
form. This institutional deprotection of employment outcome of the process of globalization 
of the Algerian economy can be building barriers to entry for certain jobs when the economy 
gets a workforce of more educated. This segmentation, attests to the interest support actions in 
the process of restructuring and deregulation, as well as all issues of the role of institutions in 
the labor market. 
 However, the procedure to validate the hypothesis segmentation of the labor market requires 
some caution and put some reservations as noted by Heckman and Hotz (1986). Dickens and 
Lang (1985) go further than that, they believe that even if wage-setting mechanisms have 
been observed in different sectors, if the workers were free to move on low-wage sectors, in 
order to obtain higher returns to education and experience in high-wage sectors, then the 
segmentation of the labor market does not exist. Both authors have developed a technique to 
test the hypothesis of limited mobility between sectors, however, this technique has been 
widely criticized by Heckman and Hotz (1986). So, the question is whether the allocation of 
the individual segment results from a process of exclusion or a deliberate choice especially 
considering that individuals maximize their utility rather than their income. This opens the 
door to future work.  
The current situation of the Algerian labor market involves all social actors and requires the 
opening of a broad debate without exclusive. Indeed, no one should ignore its operation with 
two speeds: one governed by formal standards and labor laws and the informal sector in the 
margins of legality as specified by the labor code among others. Any reform of the welfare 
system is automatically entered in duration and can not therefore obey cyclical considerations. 
17 
 
To do this, the research community is particularly challenged to inform the public debate. 
Should this reflection can be powered by reliable data and relayed by the media and civil 
society!  
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Table 1: Identification of segments of the labor market 
  Agriculral  Modern unprotected  Modern protected 
  Effective (10
3
) % Effective(10
3
) % Effective (10
3
) % 
Affiliation to social Security            
Yes  60 22,01 0 0 2941 100 
No 214 77,99 935 100 0 0 
Total 274 100 935 100 2941 100 
Legal sector            
Administration 0 0 0 0 1900 64,6 
Public 53 19,32 0 0 819 27,85 
Private  221 80,68 935 100 222 7,56 
Total 274 100 935 100 2941 100 
Mode of Payment           
Month  119 43,53 625 67,21 2883 98,08 
Fifteen 2 0,77 18 1,99 1 0,04 
Week  8 2,81 77 8,22 10 0,36 
Day 144 52,88 210 22,58 45 1,52 
Total 273 100 930 100 2939 100 
Situation in the  profession          
Permanent 78 28,64 358 38,62 2692 91,93 
Not permanent 188 68,97 554 59,79 230 7,86 
Other 7 2,4 15 1,59 6 0,21 
Total 273 100 927 100 2928 100 
Sexe           
Male 272 99,07 847 90,61 2474 84,12 
Female 3 0,93 88 9,39 467 15,88 
Total 274 100 935 100 2941 100 
Education           
Uneducated 66 24,2 111 11,89 329 11,19 
Literate 24 8,64 53 5,65 161 5,47 
Primary  (1&2 cycles 
fondamental) 90 32,81 295 31,55 543 18,47 
Average (3 cycle 
fondamental) 70 25,49 314 33,57 714 24,28 
Secondary  18 6,46 140 15,01 806 27,41 
High 7 2,39 22 2,33 387 13,17 
Total 274 100 935 100 2941 100 
Age           
Under 25 years 88 32 278 29,74 365 12,42 
(25-34) 71 25,81 348 37,26 917 31,17 
(35-49) 87 31,68 250 26,75 1281 43,57 
50  years and over 29 10,51 58 6,25 378 12,84 
Total 274 100 935 100 2941 100 
Average wage (Algerian 
dinar) 9272,36 9084,88 14705 
                                                                                         Source: Consumer Survey, ONS, 2000 
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                                    Table 2: Hausman specification test 
Omitted Chi2 df P>chi2 Evidence 
Agrical 47627,85 10 0.000 against Ho 
Modern unprotected -19385,85
14
  10 1.000 for  Ho 
Modern protected -1.61e+05 10 1.000 for  Ho 
                                                                               Source: Consumer Survey, ONS, 2000. 
 
Table 3: Estimation of the equation of access to different segments (multinomial probit) 
Variables Coef Sig Coef Sig 
  Agrical Modern  unprotected 
Female -1,383 ***
15
 -0,216 *** 
Mal Ref -- -- -- 
No single 0,489 *** -0,042 *** 
Single Ref -- -- -- 
Literate -0,297 *** -0,012 *** 
Primary 1 and 2 -0,521 *** -0,152 *** 
Average -1,178 *** -0,721 *** 
Secondary -1,957 *** -1,386 *** 
High -1,705 *** -1,985 *** 
Uneducated Ref *** -- -- 
Rural 0,468 *** -0,214 *** 
Urban Ref -- -- -- 
Age -0,235 *** -0,147 *** 
Age squared 0,002 *** 0,001 *** 
Constant 3,935 *** 3,35 *** 
Modern protected  is the base 
outcome N   = 11036   Log likelihood = -2711498,3        
 Wald chi2(20)   =  692979,67 Prob > chi2    =     0, 000     
                                                                                       Source: Consumer Survey, ONS, 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
14
 Obtaining a chi-square statistic negative means that the model fitted on these data fails to meet the asymptotic 
assumptions of the Hausman test. 
 
15
 Significative at 1 % 
21 
 
Table 4: Estimated earnings equations controlling for selection bias 
  Agrical (1) Modern  unprotected  (2) Modern protected (3) 
lnw Coef Sig Coef Sig Coef Sig 
Experience 0,0259 *** 0,0231 *** 0,0677 *** 
Expérience 
squared -0,0003 *** -0,0004 *** -0,0009 *** 
Literate 0,0579 * 0,0418 ns 0,1274 ns 
Primary 1 and 2 0,1406 *** -0,0449 ns 0,1979 *** 
Average 0,1559 *** 0,0117 ns 0,2979 *** 
Secondary 0,329 *** 0,0519 ** 0,6516 *** 
High 1,0092 *** 0,1183 ** 0,9622 *** 
Uneducated Ref - Réf - Réf - 
Female -0,207 ns -0,611 *** -0,1867 *** 
Mal Ref   Réf   Réf   
No single -0,004 ns 0,0632 ns 0,1532 *** 
Single Ref   Réf      
lambda 0,0004 ns 0,0327 ns -1,2395 *** 
constant 8,564 *** 8,7061 *** 8,1868 *** 
Model (3) N=7494      Prob > F=0,000   Adj. R-squared=0,3638 
Model(2)  N=2226   Prob > F=0,000   Adj. R-squared=0,1630 
Model (1) N=934   Prob > F=0,000   Adj. R-squared=0,1749 
Chow  (Sig) F (1-2) =1348,86 (***)       F (1-3) =11215,65 (***)      F (2-3)=26891,43 (***)       
                                                                              Source: Consumer Survey, ONS, 2000 
 
Table 5: Decomposition of the wage gap with equations corrected for selection bias
16
 
  Gap 1 % in * Gap 2 % in * Gap 3 % in * 
Wages autonomous (1) -0,377 --- -0,519 --- 0,142 --- 
Wage advantage  (2) 0,133 11,17 0,133 9,3 -0,995 --- 
Wage disadvantage (3) 0,738 62,05 0,995 69,65 0,738 --- 
Part unexplained (2) + (3) 0,87 73,22 1,128 78,95 -0,257 --- 
Part  explained (4) 0,318 26,78 0,301 21,05 0,018 --- 
Selectivity (5) -2,179 --- -2,202 --- 0,023 --- 
  
1,189 100 1,428 100 -0,239 --- *= (2) +(3) +(4) 
Total gap -1,367 --- -1,293 --- -0,074 --- 
                                                                              Source: Consumer Survey, ONS, 2000. 
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 Gap 1: the estimated wage gap in logarithm between the protected segment and the agricultural segment. 
    Gap 2: the estimated wage gap in logarithm between the protected segment and unprotected segment. 
    Gap 3: the estimated wage gap in logarithm between the unprotected segment and agricultural segment. 
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Appendix:  
 
Table 1: estimating the gain equation for all employees 
  All employees 
lnw Coef Sig 
Experience 0,0643 *** 
Expérience squared -0,0008 *** 
Literate 0,1419 *** 
Primary 1 and 2 0,2298 *** 
Average 0,4488 *** 
Secondary 0,8347 *** 
High 1,1898 *** 
Uneducated Réf   
Female -0,1982 *** 
Mal Réf   
No single 0,161 *** 
Single Réf   
Constant 7,82 *** 
N =   4025449     Prob>F=0,0000   AdjR-squard=0,3152 
                                                                              Source: Consumer Survey, ONS, 2000. 
 
 
 
